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is not an essential factor to the granting of such
is to endeavor to lift oneself by one's own bootstraps.
On the record before this court plaintiff is clearly entitled
to injunctive relief against defendant, and the judgment
should, therefore, be reversed.
concurred.
evidence and the findings,
SCHAUER,
in my
entitle the plaintiff to injunctive relief and
require reversal of the judgment .
.Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied July 21,
1954. Carter,
Traynor, ,J., and Schauer, J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

[L. A. No. 22991.

In Bank.

,June 25, 1954.]

LIVINGSTON HOCK AND GRAVEIJ COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Respondents, v. COUNTY OF LOS
ANGELES, Appellant.
[1] Zoning-Police Power.-Zoning ordinances, when reasonable
in object and not arbitrary in operation, constitute a justifiable
exercise of police power.
[2] !d.-Existing Nonconforming Uses.-The rights of users of
property as those rights existed under prevailing zoning conditions at time of adoption of rezoning ordinance must be
protected.
[3] !d.-Existing Nonconforming Uses.-A provision which exempts existing nonconforming uses is ordinarily included in
rezoning ordinances because of hardship and doubtful constitutionality of compelling immediate discontinuance of nonconforming uses.
[4] !d.-Existing Nonconforming Uses.-Zoning legislation looks
to futurn in regulating district development and eventual
liquidation of nonconforming uses within prescribed period

[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp., Zoning, § 5 et seq.; Am.Jur., Zoning,§ 10.
[3] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp., Zoning, § 19; Am.Jur., Zoning,
§ 146 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-4, 6, 7, 10] Zoning; [5] Constitutional
Law,§ 91; [8] Administrative Law,§ 19; [9] Administrative Law,
§ 22.
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commensurate with inyestment
be

Power. -Implicit in theory of
power,
differentiated from power of eminent
that incidental
to an individual will not
for
morals and general
and unrea~onable application
in
case.
[6] Zoning-Existing Nonconforming Uses.-Hc:wning regulations
which
operators of a cement hatching plant to continue
their
use of property for 20 years as an "automatic exception" to rezoning restrictions, but which authorize
revocation of such exception where it can be done without
impairment of "constitutional rights," are not unconstitutional.
[7] !d.-Existing Nonconforming Uses.--There can be no constitutional objection to provision in a rezoning ordinance which
authorizes planning commission to revoke an automatic exception where, after a public hearing on notice, it is found that
nonconforming use is so exercised as to be detrimental to public
health or safety or as to be a nuisance; revocation of right
to continue a previously existing lawful business because of
such finding would he legitimate exercise of police power.
[8] Administrative Law-Court Review-Remedies.- Either certiorari or mandamus is appropriate remedy to test proper
exercise of discretion vested in a local board.
[9] !d.-Court Review-Issues.-In certiorari or mandamus proceedings to review action of local board, the chief issues are
whether person affec·ted has lwen accorded a hearing and, if
so, whether there is any evidence to support order of such
board.
[10] Zoning-Injunctive Relief From Interference With Business
Operated Under Excepted Use.-Operators of a cement hatching plant are not entitled to injunctive relief against enforcement of county zoning ordinance which would prohibit them
from conducting such plant in a rezoned district, where transcript of hearing before regional planning commission is not
part of record of case,
notwithstanding fact that plaintiffs admittedly complied with smog and air pollution regulatory requirements their plant might still be so operated as
to be detrimental to public health or safety or as to be a
nuisance, where propriety of planning commission's finding on
these issues cannot be determined without recourse to pro-

[5]

[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional
Constitutional Law, § 245.

r~aw,

§ 144 et seq.; Am.Jur.,

ordinance

Action to
in a rezoned

Denio, Hart, Taubman &

for Respondents.

SPENCE, J.-Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the county of
Los Angeles from enforcing against them certain zoning ordimmce provisions which would prohibit them from conducting
a cement mixing plant in a rezoned district. They recovered
judgment upon the
that the ordinance provisions
in question could not be constitutionally applied to require
the removal of their existing business as a nonconforming
use, and therefore ''any action purportedly taken under . . .
snch provisions [was] invalid and [had] no effect as to . . .
plaintiffs.'' Defendant challenges the propriety of this judgment on these gTounds :
the ordinance
are
not constitutionally objectionable in application to plaintiffs'
business; and (2) plaintifts' remedy is by writ of certiorari
or mandamus, precluding injunctive or declaratory relief.
Settled principles of law sustain defendant's position.
'l'he Pacific l~lectric Hailway
owned a parcel of
land in an area in Los Angeles County known as the Artesia
Industrial District. 'rhe area was used exclusively for industrial and manufacturing purposes. Over Pacific Electric's
land there passed a main double track railway line with two
separate spur tracks to serve the neighboring eommercial
and industrial plants. On ,J a nnary 31, 1950, Pacific Electric
leased 20,000 square feet of its land to plaintiffs. At that
time all of this area was in an M-3 zone
, under
ordinance No. 1494 (new series) of the
of Los Angeles,
permitting any building structure or improvement to be
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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erected, established or maintained thereon without .,..,<,tT'lnl"l
as to use or occupancy.
Plaintiffs erected on the leased property a hatching plant
for the loading of readymix concrete mixer trucks with concrete aggregates, a use then permissible in any M-3 zone in
the county. The plant was erected pursuant to a building
permit issued by the county building department and was
completed prior to March 21, 1950. Plaintiffs complied with
all the smog control and air pollution ordinances of the
county, and they secured a permit authorizing the operation
of their plant and certifying that after inspection, it had
been found to be complying with these requirements. The
plant cost $18,000 to build; $80,000 worth of mixer trucks
were purchased; and both the plant and trucks have been
in continuous operation.
On March 21, 1950, after the erection and operation of
the plant and purchase of the trucks, the county adopted an
urgency ordinance (No. 5508) rezoning the Artesia Industrial
District into an M-1 zone (light manufacturing). Upon such
rezoning, existing uses were protected as automatic exceptions ( § 531) with such structure as plaintiffs' plant allowed
20 years for continued use unless such time period should
be extended or the automatic exception should be revoked
as provided in the amending ordinance. Section 533 provided
for the revocation of an automatic exception ''if the [Regional
Planning) Commission finds: (a) That the condition of the
improvements, if any, on the property are such that to require
the property to be used only for those uses permitted in
the zone where it is located would not impair the constitutional rights of any person; (b) That the nature of the
improvements are such that they can be altered so as to be
used in conformity with the uses permitted in the zone in
which such property is located without impairing the constitutional rights of any person." Section 649, as here material, authorized the planning commission, after a public hearing as therein provided, to "revoke or modify any permit, exception or other approval whieh has been g-ranted either automatically or by special action of either the Board of Supervisors or the Commission, pursuant to . . . the provisions
of [the] ordinance [where] (e) . . . the use for which the
approval was granted is so exercised as to be detrimental
to the public health or safety, or so as to be a nuisance."
On November 25, 1950, plaintiffs received a notice through
the mail that a hearing would be held December 1, 1950,
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before the Regional Planning Commission with reference to
the revocation of their exception. Pacific Electric, owner
of the property, was never given notice of the hearing. Following the scheduled public hearing and on December 6,
1950, the planning commission notified plaintiffs that their
"use of the property with a cement hatching plant thereon"
was ''being exercised in such a manner as to be detrimental
to public health, and so as to be a nuisance"; and that their
to operate their plant was therefore revoked "effective
as of January 31st, 1952." On January 16, 1951, plaintiffs
appealed to the county board of supervisors, which affirmed
the planning commission's decision. In .August, 1951, the
board added to the basic zoning ordinance (No. 1494) section
404 of ordinance No. 5800, expressly confirming the expiration date on plaintiffs' exception as "January 31, 1952."
Thereafter plaintiffs brought this action seeking (1) to enjoin
defendant county from ''interfering with'' the operations of
the cement hatching plant "after January 31, 1952" and
( 2) to have the court "declare the rights and duties of plaintiffs and defendant with respect to the property and hatching
plant . . . and determine the construction and validity of
the purported action taken by [the] Regional Planning Commission . ~ . ''
Defendant admitted in its answer that its proceedings
against plaintiffs were not taken under the provisions of
section 3491 of the Civil Code relating to the abatement of
a public nuisance but rather were instituted under authority
of sections 533 and 649 of the zoning ordinance, supra, providing for the "revocation of automatic exceptions." The
trial court determined that these sections, as well as section
404, supra, affirming the expiration date on plaintiffs' exception, were ''invalid'' in permitting ''unconstitutional encroachments" upon plaintiffs' property rights and therefore
''any action . . . taken'' by the Regional Planning Commission "under . . . such provisions [was] invalid and [would J
have no effect as to . . . plaintiffs." Upon such premise the
court expressly refrained from making "any findings as to
what occurred at the l1earing before the Regional Planning
Commission on December 1, 1950, or whether or not there
was any competent evidence at said hearing to prove any
eanse for revocation." Plaintiffs accordingly were granted
the injunctive relief sought. Defendants attack the propriety
of snch judgment npon the merits as well as upon the proeedural phases.

126

RocK

ETc.

C.2d

amendment may not be
to require
the removal of their
business from the rezoned district.
maintain that their unlimited right to operate
their cement
in the district, a lawful use of
the
could not be curtailed or
limited
rezoning without violating the constitutional
of due process of law. 'I' hey
on Jones
v. C-ity
Los
211 Cal. 304 [295 P. 14], wherein
the court refused to apply
so as to destroy a
valuable sanatorium
an ordinance which prohibited
such institutions in areas r("zoned as residential. Under the
particular circumstances of that case, showing "substantial
injury'' to be involved
321), it was deemed unreasonable
and arbitrary to destroy the established enterprise. But
each case must be determined on its own facts. (Of. Beverly
Oil Co. v. City
Los Angeles, 40 Cal.2d 552, 560 [254 P.2d
865] .)
Moreover, the ordinance under consideration in the Jones
case differed
from the one here involved. There
tl1e ordinance, cast in the form of a penal statute rather than
in the form of a comprehensive zoning law, prohibited the
maintenance of sanitariums of a certain type in designated
districts. By its terms the ordinance, unlike the ordinary
zoning laws,
to have both a retroactive as well as
a prospective effect,
automatically prohibiting the
continued maintenance of several established sanitariums
representing ]arge investments. In other words, no provision
was made for any automatic exception for existing nonconforming nses. In the
case, the zoning ordinance
does provide for automatic exceptions of reasonable duration
for
nonconforming useR,
however, to earlier
revocation of the automatic
if the use for which
approval was
is so exereised "as to be detrimental
to the
health or
or so as to be a nuisance"
( § 649,
; and the power
upon notice,
the question Of Whether the nl",()T\,Pl't"
so used was
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Commission.

a result

not urge that the
in the ,Jones case is the approin the present ease. It is
that the
available to
pn'Yc~ntiYe,
ll"<l,V of all aeti,m fnr
relief;
will hereillafter appear, other remedies were available in
the
ease to review the action taken
the
C'omrnission in revoking
[2] 'l'he rigbts of the users of
rights
existed under prevailiJJg zoning eonditions are well recognized
and have always been
(Edmonds v. County of Los
A
40 Cal.2cl 642, GGJ [2:)5 P.2d 772].) [3]
Accordingly, a prrrdsion 'which exempts existing nonconforming
uses is ordinarily included in rezoning ordinances because of
the hardship and doubtful coiJstitutionality of compelling the
imr>wdiate discontinuance of nonconforming uses. (Ibid.)
Prntedion of an undel'taking inyo\ving the investment
of capital is akin to thE' protection of a nonconforming use
existing at the time that rezoning conditions become effective.
(County of San D'iego v. 111 cClurlcen, 37 Cal.2d 683, 691
[ 2:~4 P .2c1 972].) [ 4] Ho\YeYer, zoning legislation looks
to the future in regulating district development and the
eventual liquidation of nonconforming uses within a prescribed period commensurate with the investment involved.
(Ibid. p. G86.) 'l'he mere fad that some hardship may
thereby be experienced is not controlling, for "every exercise
of the police power is apt to affect adversely the property
interest of somebody." ( Zahn v. Board of Public Works,
195 Cal. 497.512 [234 P. 888].) [5] Implicit in the theory
of the police power, as differentiated from the power of
eminent domain. is tlJe principle that incidental injury to
an individual wi1l not prevent its operation, once it is shown
to bP exercised for proper purposes of public health, safety,
morals, and general welfare, and tJ1ere is no arbitrary and
unreasonable application in the particular case. (Wilkins v.
City of San Bernardino, supra, 29 Cal.2d 332, 338; Beverly
Oil Co. v. C-ity of Los Angeles, supra, 40 Ca1.2d 552, 557.)
[6] Here the rezoning permits plaintiffs to continue their
nonconforming use of the property for 20 years as an "automatic exeeption '' to the rezoning restrictions ( § 531, supra;
Edmonds v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 40 Cal.2d 642,
6fil) bnt authorizes revocation of such exception where it
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can be done without the
( § 533,
. Manifestly, care has been taken in such rezoning regulations to refrain from the interference with
constitutional guarantees, and in the
of such express
language it would be a contradiction in terms to hold that the
regulations are nevertheless uneonstitutional. [7] IJikewise, there can be no constitutional
to the authorized
revocation by the planning commission of an automatic exception where after a public
upon
it is found
that the nonconforming use is "so exercised as to be detrimental to the public health or safety, or so as to be a nuisance.''
( § 649, snpra; Ricciardi v. County of Los Angeles, 115 Cal.
App.2d 569, 577 [252 P.2d 773n
llevocation of the
right to continue a previously existing lawful business because
of such finding ·would be a legitimate exercise of the police
power. (Ex parte Quong W o, 161 Cal. 220, 230 [118 P.
714]; Jones v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 211 Cal. 304, 316;
In re Jones, 56 Cal.App.2d 658, 663-664 [133 P.2d 418];
Cantrell v. Board of Supervisors, 87 Cal.App.2d 471, 477
It therefore follows that the rezon[197 P.2d 218].)
ing regulations authorizing the revocation of ''automatic
exceptions'' are constitutionally valid as a whole and come
within the prescribed objectives of the police power. There
now remains the question of whether in application to plaintiffs' existing cement plant there has been an unconstitutional
impairment of property rights.
The llegional Planning Commission was a local board exercising quasi-judicial powers under the ordinance in determining the facts in plaintiffs' case. (Greif v. Dullea, 66 CaL
App.2d 986, 1009 [153 P.2d 581]; North Side etc. Assn. v.
Hillside etc. Park, 70 Cal.App.2d 609, 616 [161 P.2d 618];
Cantrell v. Board of Supervisors, snpra, 87 CaLApp.2d 471,
475.) [8] Either certiorari or man damns is an appropriate remedy to test the proper exercise of discretion vested
in a local board. (Walker v. City of San Gabriel, 20 Cal.2d
879, 881 [129 P.2d g49, 142 AI.~.R. 1383] ; La Prade v. Department of Water & Powe·r, 27 Cal.2d 47,53 [162 P.2d 13].)
[9] Under such review, the chief issues are whether the
person affected has been accorded a hearing, and if so, whether
there is any evidence to support the order of the local board.
(Ibid.)
[10] In the present case, the transcript of the hearing
before the planning commission is not a part of the record.
Plaintiffs allege that there was "no competent evidence to
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prove any cause for revocation" in their case, and that Pacific
owner of the property, was never given notice of
as required by the ordinance regulations. In
answer to this latter point, defendant asserts that ''Pacific
Electric . . . was represented at the hearing," a voluntary
appearance which eliminates any cause for complaint in
to give the
notice (see Hopkins v. MacCttl451
P.2d 950]), and that in
35 Cal.App.2d
any event the presence of Pacific Electric was of no concern
to plaintiffs in the determination of their case before the
planning commission. Although plaintiffs admittedly did
comply with smog and air pollution regulatory requirements,
their plant might be still so operated "as to be detrimental
to the public health or safety, or so as to be a nuisance."
( § 649, supra.) The propriety of the planning commission's
finding on these issues cannot be determined without recourse
to the proceedings taken before it "in the manner provided
by law" (Riccia,rdi v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 115
Cal.App.2d 569, 580) and examination of the evidence there
submitted. The validity of section 404 of the ordinance,
snpra, affirming the expiration date of plaintiffs' right to
continue the operation of their cement plant in the rezoned
district, would necessarily depend on whether the planning
commission's action was unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive
in ordering revocation in plaintiffs' case. Under all the circumstances, plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law for
review of the planning commission's proceedings, and therefore they are not entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief.
(North Side etc. Assn. v. Hillside etc. Park, supra, 70 Cal.
App.2d 609, 615; Hostetter v. Alderson, 38 Cal.2d 499, 500
[241 P.2d 230] .)
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, ,J., and 'l'raynor, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The ordinance in this case changed the zone in which
plaintiffs' bmdness (concrete aggregates loading plant) was
then established to embrace only "light manufacturing" to
which class plaintiffs' business did not belong. As is customary, tl1e ordinance excepted from its operation for a
period of 20 years, existing uses such as plaintiffs'. Yet in
the next breath it provided that any exception could be
revoked if the planning commission found that that could
43 C.2d-5
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be done without
the constitutional rights of the
existing user or where the
use was detrimental to
the ''public health or safety'' or was a ''nuisance.'' For
all practical purposes, therefore, no exception was granted
for existing uses because the exception could be taken away
at any time, and in the case at bar, was taken away from
plaintiffs with impunity.
It is settled in this state as elsewhere that a
nance which requires the discontinuance of
uses existing when the ordinance was adopted is a deprivation
of property without due process of law contrary to the federal
and state Constitutions. (Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211
CaL 304 [295 P. 14]; Beverly Oil Co. v.
Los Angeles,
40 Cal.2d 552 [254 P.2d 865] ; Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 CaL2d 332 [171 P.2d 542]; Clemons v. City of
Los Angeles, 36 Cal.2d 95 [222 P.2d 439] ; Price v. Schwafel,
92 Cal.App.2d 77 [206 P.2d 683]; Acker v. Baldwin, 18
Cal.2d 341 [115 P.2d 455]; Yokley, Zoning Law & Practice,
§ 133; 58 Am.Jur., Zoning, § 148; McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed.), § 25.181.) In Village of Terrace Park
v. Errett, 12 F.2d 240, a zoning ordinance was held invalid
which prohibited plaintiff from operating his gravel processing plant which was operating when the ordinance was
passed. In In re Kelso, 147 Cal. 609 [82 P. 241, 109 Am.
St.Rep. 178, 2 L.R.A.N.S. 796], it was held that an ordinance
could not validly prohibit the maintenance of a rock quarry
in the city. In Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 [25
S.Ct. 18, 49 L.Ed. 169] (reversing our court's decision in
Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 139 Cal. 179 [72 P. 970,
96 Am.St.Rep. 95] ) the court held an ordinance unconstitutional which prohibited a gas works as applied to an existing gas works.
As a zoning ordinance which does not exempt existing nonconforming uses is invalid, it necessarily follows that an
ordinance, like the one here, which excepts such uses but
authorizes a planning commission to revoke those exceptions
where the public safety or health is involved, is also invalid.
If public health and safety (police
, the basis for the
zoning, cannot justify the destruction of existing uses, an
administrative agency cannot be given such power. 'rhose
inherently, or as exeruses cannot be eliminated unless
cised, are nuisances. (Jones v.
of Los Angeles, supra,
211 Cal. 304.)
Assuming the commission could be given the authority to
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that an
nonconforming use was a nuisance,
hence not under the exception for such uses, it is difficult
to see how the
' business could be a nuisance. It is
in an area zoned for light manufacturing. Hence there is no
the residents in a residential area.
of
to conduct its business and it
"smog control and air pollution" ordiof the case the majority reverses the
an injunction in an action for preventive
relief and in so doing states that plaintiffs
cannot reYiew the action of the commission in a proceeding
for declaratory relief or injunction. In effect the trial court
is told to dismiss the action. .Although it is said in Hostetter
38 Cal.2d 499 [241 P.2d 230], that a determination
a local administrative agency cannot be reviewed in
a declaratory relief action, it has been done (see Edmonds v.
of Los
40 Cal.2d 642 [255 P.2d 772] ; Otis v.
of Los A
52 Cal.App.2d 605 [126 P.2d 954];
v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 21 Cal.2d 399 [132
P.2d 804]; 15 CaLTur.2d, Declaratory Relief, § 63; 2 Cal.
.Administrative Law, § 199). In any event, the declaratory relief action may be treated as mandamus, a proper
remedy for review (Hostetter v. Alderson, supr·a, 38 Cal.2d
499; 2 Cal.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 200), and it was
alleged by plaintiffs that the commission had no competent
evidence to prove any cause for revocation of its exemption
from the ordinance. This should be pointed out to avoid a
dismissal of the action.
I am convinced that the trial court correctly applied the
law to the facts of this case, and the judgment should be
affirmed.
SHENK, J., and SCHAUER, J.-We dissent.
In our view the opinion prepared for the District Court
of .Appeal by ,Justice McComb and concurred in by Presid.Justice Moore and Justice Fox (reported in (Cal ..App.)
2GO P .2d 811),
discusses and correctly resolves
the questions presented on this appeal. For the reasons
therein stated we would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied July 21,
1954. Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

